Want the latest on the economics of conflicts of law? Erin O'Hara and I have it for you. Here's the abstract:
In this revised entry for a new edition of Elgar's Encyclopedia of Law and Economics we discuss the law and economics of conflict of laws and choice of law, focusing on the law in the US. We first consider choice of law when the parties have not effectively chosen their governing law by contract. We address four questions: (1) Why do courts ever apply anything other than the law of the forum? (2) If a court sometimes applies foreign law, is a rule-based or more modern standard-based approach to its choice preferable? (3) Why have so many states abandoned rule-based approaches in favor of standard-based ones? and (4) Is there any real practical difference between the First Restatement and modern approaches? We then discuss costs and benefits of enforcing parties' contractual choice of law provisions. We conclude that permitting parties to choose the governing law that best fits their transactions and future private disputes can enhance jurisdictional competition and help restore predictability to the conflict of laws problem. When states nevertheless wish to insist on the application of their own governing law, they should state that explicitly in statutes.
This is an important topic in our multijurisdictional world, and here's an opportunity to read all about it in one clear, concise little article.
And while you're at it, get our book on jurisdictional competition, The Law Market.
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